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I analyze the effects associated with the introduction of the earnings test on older Czech
males’ labor supply in 1996. Using data from the Labor Force Survey, I apply a difference-in-
differences estimator to measure the effect of the policy change in the Czech pension scheme
using a sample of retired males aged 60 to 64 in 1995 and 1996. I use an age group not
affected by the earnings test to separate the effect associated with the implementation of the
earnings test. Correcting for sample selection, results indicate that the earnings test decreases
the labor supply of retired males affected by the policy change. Their participation reduces by
7.7 percentage points, while hours of work decline by 4.8 hours per week. The response to the
earnings test is moderately lower after controlling for the announcement of the policy change.
The pecuniary value of the labor supply drop was negligible for the state in 1996, but
increased significantly between 1996 and 2000.
Abstrakt
Analyzuji vliv výdělkového testu, který byl v  České republice zaveden v  roce 1996, na
nabídku práce starších mužů. Efekt této politiky měřím pomocí odhadu diference
v diferencích na vzorku důchodců-mužů z Výběrového šetření pracovních sil ve věku 60 až
64 let v období 1995 a 1996. Vliv výdělkového testu separuji pomocí věkové podskupiny
mužů, kteří nebyli zavedením této politiky ovlivněni. Výsledky korigované o výběr vzorku
ukazují, že nabídka práce důchodců-mužů, na které se výdělkový test vztahuje, je nižší.
Participace poklesla o 7,7 procentního bodu, zatímco počet odpracovaných hodin se snížil o
4,8 týdně. Reakce na výdělkový test je v absolutní hodnotě mírně nižší po odečtení vlivu
spojeného s oznámením zavedení politiky. Peněžní hodnota ušlé celkové nabídky práce byla
v roce 1996 zanedbatelná, ale významně se zvýšila mezi roky 1996 a 2000.
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The objective of public social security is to provide support income during disabil-
ity or retirement. Tracing the historical origins, retirement appeared as a form
of health insurance. Since costs of monitoring the health of older workers were
high, insurance companies introduced an age limit. After that age, all workers
were eligible for beneﬁts. Public policy of implementing the age limit at which
all workers are eligible for old-age retirement beneﬁts is, however, vulnerable to
demographic changes. The increasing life expectancy in recent decades weakened
the disability concept of retirement. Thus, at present, changes to public social
security are being introduced in many countries. These changes include adjust-
ing the age of retirement and restrictions on working pensioners’ eligibility for
retirement beneﬁts.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the retirement decisions of older
workers in the Czech Republic and to assess the labor supply eﬀects associated
with the introduction of the earnings test. In particular, a new law eﬀective since
January 1996 introduced a change in the normal retirement age and imposed
beneﬁt eligibility constraints for working pensioners. Before January 1996, the
normal retirement age was 60 for males, while after January 1996, it has been
increasing by 2 months every year until 2006, and after 2007 it will be 62 in the
case of males.2 An individual is eligible for retirement beneﬁts if he has reached at
least the normal retirement age and if he has worked for a particular period before
retirement. This implies that some persons are eligible for retirement beneﬁts later
than at the normal retirement age. After January 1996, a pension is not payable
for a period of 2 years after the date at which a person is entitled for beneﬁts
if the income from post-retirement work exceeds twice the minimum subsistence
amount.3 Future retirement beneﬁts are increased in this case to compensate for
the unpaid beneﬁt si nt h es a m ew a ya si nt h ec a s eo fd e l a y e dr e t i r e m e n t . T h e
pension is always payable if the person reaches 65 years of age. Before January
1996, there were no beneﬁt eligibility constraints in the case of post-retirement
work. However, the validity of employment contracts for pensioners was limited
1I call the age limit the normal retirement age. In many countries, workers are allowed to
retire before the normal retirement age. Their beneﬁts are reduced.
2The normal retirement age of females depended and remains dependent on the number of
children raised. Therefore, I focus only on males in this paper.
3The minimum subsistence amount is a minimum amount of money necessary to cover basic
life expenses. It is declared and recognized by the state.
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In the next section, I brieﬂy summarize the previous literature related to this
issue. Then I apply the piece-wise linear budget constraint approach to examine
the labor supply eﬀects of the introduction of the earnings test on transitions to
retirement and on the pensioners’ labor supply.5 Iu s et h ed i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator applied in Baker and Benjamin (1999) to measure the eﬀect of the
implementation of the earnings test rule using a sample of retired males from the
Labor Force Survey aged 60 to 64 in 1995 and 1996. The rule aﬀects individuals of
age 60 to 61. I use the age group 62 to 64 to control for other eﬀects not related
to the policy change. Section 5 describes the data, while the following section
provides results. The last two sections provide policy implications and concluding
remarks.
2. Survey of Literature
Most earlier empirical studies of the eﬀects of the earnings test on older workers’
labor supply in the U.S. are based on the Retirement History Survey. Burtless and
Moﬃtt (1985) were among the ﬁrst researchers who proposed a life-cycle model
of the joint choice of retirement date and hours of work after retirement. Their
simulation analysis of the eﬀects of the social security changes revealed that the
elimination of the earnings test would increase the post-retirement hours of work
only slightly. Similarly, little eﬀect is found on retirement probabilities.
Reimers and Honig (1993) conﬁrmed negligible eﬀects of the elimination of
the earnings test on the labor supply of the aged. They estimated the hazard
function for white males’ labor market reentry after retirement. The budget con-
straint faced by these individuals is continuous and the earnings test should have
no eﬀect on their labor supply under two assumptions. First, retirees face a con-
tinuous choice of work hours, and, second, they take into account the actuarial
adjustment of the social security beneﬁts postponed as a result of the earnings
test. Reimers and Honig found no support for these assumptions. Instead, these
authors concluded that the exempt amount aﬀects the labor market reentry and
that older males respond to current beneﬁts rather than to social security wealth.
Fixed costs of work or lack of acceptable part-time jobs for the aged explain this
4Rules for retirement before the normal retirement age were not changed in 1995 and 1996.
Details of the Czech pension scheme are described in Galušˇ cák (2002).
5The piece-wise linear budget constraint approach is adopted in Baker and Benjamin (1999),
Friedberg (2000), or Reimers and Honig (1993).
3phenomenon.
Whitehouse (1990) analyzed the eﬀects of the earnings test rules on the pen-
sioners’ labor supply in the U.K. Using the Family Expenditure Survey, he found
no substantial bunching below the earnings test limits. The abolition of the earn-
ings test in the U.K. in 1989 has thus a limited impact on pensioners’ labor supply.
The proportion of working pensioners is small in the U.K., and their earnings fall
far below the exempt amount. Previous improvements to work incentives for the
aged had limited impact and did not reverse the long run downward trend in their
labor supply.
In the estimation of the eﬀects of the earnings test on older individuals’ labor
supply, the crucial problem is appropriate controlling for other eﬀects. Friedberg
(2000) raised a point that the Retirement History Survey covers a period with little
variation of the earnings test rules. She investigated changes in the earnings test
that were introduced between 1978 and 1990 using data from the March Current
Population Surveys. Friedberg used the behavior of age groups not aﬀected by
the earnings test as a control for other changes in the labor supply. Using the
piece-wise linear budget constraint approach, she found that older workers bunch
substantially at or just below the earnings exempt amount, and that this bunching
reacts to the changes in the earnings test. Her results suggest that older workers
enjoy greater ﬂexibility in hours of work.6 A simulation analysis of removing the
earnings test indicates that the eﬀect on hours of work and earnings is strongly
positive in this case.
Baker and Benjamin (1999) argued that the age-based isolation of the eﬀects of
changes in the earnings test rules is invalidated by dynamic eﬀects. The removal
of the earnings test increases the relative compensation of the aﬀected age group.
This reduces the labor supply at younger ages. Baker and Benjamin analyzed
the sequential elimination of the earnings test in Canada in 1975 and 1977. The
control group is separated from the aﬀected group by geography.7 They ﬁrst es-
timate the diﬀerence before and after the policy change. The second diﬀerence is
geographical. Their diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates indicate that the abolition
of the earnings test is associated with a large increase in weeks of work, while par-
ticipation is virtually unchanged. These results are consistent with the presence
of ﬁxed costs of work or labor market rigidities. Dynamic eﬀects associated with
6Ruhm (1990) found that over one half of household heads from the Retirement History
Survey retire partially from career jobs. He described the importance of “bridge” jobs between
career jobs and full retirement.
7Two public pension plans cover workers in Quebec and in the rest of Canada.
4the policy change are estimated to be minimal.
In this paper, I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator to analyze the eﬀect
of the Czech earnings test on retired males’ labor supply in 1996. In particular, I
estimate the diﬀerence in labor supply between age groups 60 to 61 and 62 to 64.
The other diﬀerence is between the years 1995 and 1996.
The institutional framework of the U.S. test is similar to the Czech earnings
test.8 Based on the data from the Czech Statistical Oﬃce and the International
Labour Organization on average wages in industries excluding agriculture, hunt-
ing, forestry, and ﬁshing, the ratio of the exempt amount for ages after the normal
retirement age to the average monthly wage is 0.55 in the Czech Republic, and
0.60 in the United States in 1996. It indicates that the Czech earnings test is
moderately more stringent than the U.S. test. Therefore, the Czech earnings test
might be expected to have a similar or greater impact on the labor supply of the
aged than the test in the United States.
3. Eﬀects of the Earnings Test
The role of the actuarial adjustment for unpaid beneﬁts in the case of the earn-
ings test or postponed retirement is unrecognized or neglected in the literature.
Reimers and Honig (1993) found that the labor market reentry of retired individ-
uals was not aﬀected when the delayed retirement credit was increased. Similarly,
Friedberg (2000) found that the delayed retirement credit does not aﬀect the
response to the earnings test.
According to Galušˇ cák (2002), the delayed retirement credit is not large enough
to compensate for the males’ unpaid retirement beneﬁts in the Czech Republic in
1996. Assuming that older Czech males are farsighted, they ignore the compensa-
tion for the unpaid beneﬁts.9 Therefore, their labor market behavior is changed
after the introduction of the earnings test in 1996. The budget constraint per-
ceived by males aﬀected by the earnings test is piece-wise linear.
Suppose an individual chooses leisure l between zero and unity. Denote w a
net wage before retirement, wR a post-retirement net wage, and B a retirement
beneﬁt. Before retirement, an individual earns income Y from the wage:
Y =( 1− l)w. (3.1)
8See Friedberg (2000) and Galušˇ cák (2002) for details on earnings tests in the U.S. and the
Czech Republic.
9If older workers are myopic, they neglect the compensation even if it is fair. The story of
this section remains unchanged in this case.
5Before the introduction of the earnings test, a retired individual receives
Y =( 1− l)w
R + B. (3.2)
Figure 8.1 illustrates budget constraints before the earnings test was intro-
duced. Before retirement, an older worker faces the constraint TM deﬁned in
equation (3.1). When an individual retires, he faces a new budget constraint
KLM’ given by equation (3.2).10 The two constraints intersect at a point L where
leisure equals l1. Workers who allocate more leisure than l1 will retire, while others
will continue to work. It follows from equations (3.1) and (3.2) that
l1 =1−
B
w − wR. (3.3)
When the earnings test is introduced, a retired person faces the constraint
PQRS with a discontinuity between points Q and R, see Figure 8.2. The con-
straints of persons before and after retirement cross at some point between Q and
Ri fw E
E+B <w R <w , where E denotes the exemption amount imposed by the




It follows from equations (3.3) and (3.4) that l2 >l 1 if w E
E+B <w R <w .
For the post-retirement wage wR <w E
E+B, the constraint of a retired individ-
ual is PQ’R’S’. This constraint intersects the budget constraint of a worker before
retirement (TM) at a point V. The leisure corresponding to the point V is
l3 =1−
B
w − wR. (3.5)
This is the same as the leisure l1 given in equation (3.3).
Incentives to retire and to work immediately after retirement are the same
after the introduction of the earnings test if individuals face the same budget con-
straints. When wR <w E
E+B, the workers’ probabilities to retire are not changed
since l3 = l1. The constraint KLM in Figure 8.1 is identical to PVM in Figure
8.2. In addition, the retirees’ post-retirement labor supply is also unchanged for
10I assume that wR <w . For a person whose pre- and post-retirement gross wage is the
s a m e ,t h en e tw a g ei sl o w e ra f t e rh er e t i r e ss i n c er e t i r e dp e r s o n sf a c eh i g h e ri n c o m et a xf r o m
their earnings than workers before retirement. I do not discuss other combinations of pre- and
post-retirement wage since they do not change the predictions drawn in this section.
6those who retire in 1996 or 1995 since only workers allocating more leisure than
l1 in 1995 and l3 in 1996 retire.
When w E
E+B <w R <w , the constraint is still KLM in 1995, but changes to
PQUM in 1996. Since l2 >l 1, it implies that the workers’ probability to retire
as well as the retirees’ post-retirement labor supply is reduced in 1996. Applying
the data from 1996, we see that incentives to retire and to supply work after
retirement are lower for individuals who face post-retirement wage between 55%
a n d1 0 0 %o ft h e i rp r e - r e t i r e m e n tw a g e . 11
Persons who retired before the introduction of the earnings test face the budget
constraint KLM’ in 1995, and PQRS in 1996, see Figures 8.1 and 8.2. Some of
those pensioners who would choose less leisure than l2 in 1995 will increase their
leisure to l2 in 1996. They shift to a higher indiﬀerence curve by moving to the
kink Q in the 1996 budget constraint. The labor supply of pensioners decreases
on average in 1996.
4. Estimation
The estimation of the eﬀects associated with the introduction of the earnings
test yields inappropriate results when the anticipation of the policy change is
neglected. In the Czech Republic, the law introducing the earnings test was passed
by Parliament in June 1995, and came into force in January 1996. During the
second half of 1995, workers between 60 and 61 years of age who had not retired
before June 1995 and who knew that they would be aﬀected by the earnings test
anticipated the policy change. Since the compensation for unpaid beneﬁts due to
the earnings test is not fair, they either postpone retirement or retire and increase
the post-retirement labor supply. Similarly, some pensioners who retired before
June 1995 and who are in the age group aﬀected by the earnings test in 1996 will
increase their labor supply between July and December 1995. The estimate of
the policy change on the pensioners’ labor supply will be biased towards greater
decline if the announcement is neglected. On the other hand, the bias is mitigated
since workers who postpone their retirement due to the announcement are those
supplying more post-retirement hours of work. Therefore, I do not follow the
remedy used by Baker and Benjamin (1999) who excluded the year preceding the
11According to the Czech Statistical Oﬃce, the average retirement beneﬁt was 4500 CZK per
month, and the exempt amount (earnings limit) imposed by the earnings test was 5400 CZK
per month in 1996.
7date of the reform. However, I present results corrected for the announcement of
the policy change to provide a comparison.
I am not able to estimate changes in retirement probabilities between 1995
and 1996 because of lack of data.12 Instead, I focus on analyzing the labor supply
of retired males. I measure the eﬀect of the policy change by a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator. I use the age group unaﬀected by the change to control for
other eﬀects not related to the introduction of the earnings test. Using the sample
of retired males aged 60 to 64, I estimate the equation




aj ∗ xij + ui (4.1)
by tobit. The dependent variable is the number of hours worked weekly. A dummy
variable year1996 is the eﬀect of 1996, while age60 61 is a dummy capturing eﬀects
speciﬁc to the group aged 60 and 61. The estimate of the coeﬃcient a3 measures
the labor supply eﬀect of the policy change on males of age 60 or 61 in 1996.
Predictions drawn in the previous section suggest that the estimate of a3 has a
negative sign.
In equation (4.1), a set of variables xij controls for personal, job-related, and
macroeconomic variables. The linear term of age in equation (4.1) is the iden-
tiﬁcation assumption. It allows one to estimate the eﬀect of the earnings test
b a s e do ns p e c i ﬁc age dummies after controlling for the labor supply eﬀect of age.
According to Friedberg (2000), the estimate of the coeﬃcient on age should have
a negative sign since the labor supply decreases for older individuals, while the
eﬀect of a higher level of education (completed at least secondary school) is pos-
itive. A positive eﬀect of a higher level of education on the labor supply is also
estimated in Burtless and Moﬃtt (1985). Reimers and Honig (1993) report a neg-
ative labor supply response of poor health. Poor health reduces the participation
of older workers according to the results in Burtless and Moﬃtt (1985). The eﬀect
of marital status is not straightforward. Burtless and Moﬃtt (1985) estimate a
negative labor supply response of married individuals. On the contrary, Friedberg
(2000) arrives at ambiguous results. Raising the exempt amount for individuals
aged 65 to 71 in 1978 yields a positive labor supply response of married persons.
The eﬀect is negative and not statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the elimination
12I derive some results on the change in retirement between 1995 and 1996 using aggregate
data in Section 7.
8of the earnings test for persons aged 70 to 71 in 1983. Blau (1998) analyzed the
joint labor force behavior of older couples in the U.S. Using the data from the
Retirement History Survey, he found an incidence of joint retirement as a result
of preferences for shared leisure. His results indicate that there is a strong asso-
ciation between transition probabilities of one spouse and the labor force status
of the other spouse. Therefore, I include a dummy variable that equals one if
the wife is working. I expect a positive eﬀect of this variable on husband’s labor
supply.
Among other explanatory variables comprising xij in equation (4.1), an oc-
cupation dummy equals one for white collar workers. Reimers and Honig (1993)
found a positive eﬀect of this variable on the labor market reentry after retirement.
They also estimated a positive eﬀect of a dummy indicating that the career job
was in the ﬁnance, public administration, or business or personal service industry.
Therefore, I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the present or last job
was white collar, and two dummies indicating the present or last employment in
agriculture or in manufacturing or construction. Both industrial dummies should
have a negative eﬀect on the pensioners’ labor supply. The last regressor in equa-
tion (4.1) is the unemployment rate from districts where individuals reside. This
variable should have a negative eﬀect on the labor supply. Finally, ui is an error
term distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
The data analyzed in this paper do not report wages. Omitting this vari-
able biases the estimates on education, occupation, and on the industrial dummy
indicating employment in agriculture. The bias from omitting the wage rate is
ambiguous, since the sign on the wage is ambiguous due to the oﬀsetting income
and substitution eﬀects.
Estimating equation (4.1) by tobit accounts for left-censored observations at
zero hours of work. The results show the overall, “reduced-form” labor supply
eﬀect of the earnings test. In order to separate the eﬀect on hours of work from the
eﬀect on participation, I estimated equation (4.1) by maximum-likelihood using
the Heckman (1979) selection procedure. The key problem is to identify exclusion
variables that determine the selection equation, but that do not explain hours
of work. Results in Blau (1998) suggest that participation is strongly associated
with marital status. Therefore, I experiment with marital status as the exclusion
variable. I also use industrial dummies as exclusion variables since average weekly
hours of work are virtually the same across industries in the data from the Labor
Force Survey.
95. Data
T h es a m p l ei sd r a w nf r o mt h eL a b o rF o r c eS u r v e y .I ti saq u a r t e r l yd a t as o u r c e
surveying approximately 1% of all households in the Czech Republic. In each
quarter, information on personal as well as labor market characteristics of all
persons of age more than 15 living in a particular household is recorded. The
sample design is a rotating panel, replacing one ﬁfth of the households in each
quarter, so that each household is interviewed each quarter over a ﬁve-quarter
period. The ﬁrst quarter of a year starts in December, the second quarter in
March, the third in June, and the fourth in October.
There are two measures of labor force status. The ﬁrst one complies with
the International Labour Organization standards. A person is considered to be a
worker if he had paid work during the previous week. The alternative measure of
labor force is based on the respondent’s answer to a question: “What was your
economic status during the previous week?”
A g ei sr e p o r t e di nw h o l ey e a r s . H o w e v e r ,h a v i n gﬁve observations for each
individual, I was able to measure the age more precisely since a change of age is
observed in the data. Assume an indivudual is of age 59 in a quarter t−1 and 60
in t. His age is, therefore, between 60 and 60 years and 3 months in the quarter
t, between 60 years and 3 months and 60 years and 6 months in t +1 ,e t c .
The sample consists of all males who considered themselves to be old-age
pensioners and were of age 60 or more and less than 65 in the second, third,
and fourth quarters of 1995 and 1996.13 In order to account for the shift in the
normal retirement age, I dropped individuals of age between 60 and 60 years and
3 months in 1996 from the sample. I assume that all individuals are eligible for
retirement beneﬁts at the normal retirement age that was 60 in 1995 and 60 years
and 2 months in 1996. Since the earnings test is applied in the period of two years
starting from the date when an individual is eligible for retirement beneﬁts, this
assumption is crucial because some persons are eligible for beneﬁts later than at
the normal retirement age. The Czech Social Security Administration records
indicate that 0.5% of males at the normal retirement age are not eligible for
beneﬁts since they do not meet the requirement for the minimum number of years
contributed to the pension scheme. This justiﬁes the assumption. Similarly, I did
not include retired males of age 65 or more in the sample.14
13Since quarters are seasonal, it is not possible to separate eﬀects related to the year 1996 in
the data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1996.
14The earnings test is not in eﬀect at age 65 and above. The number of observations is low
10The data are matched with district level unemployment rates. The unem-
ployment data are from the district labor oﬃces data recorded at the Ministry of
Labor of the Czech Republic.
Table 8.1 reports the sample statistics. The sample consists of 6564 males
aged 60 to 64 observed in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1995 and 1996.
There are 1880 observations on positive hours of work. The average number of
hours worked per week is 10.24 overall, and 35.74 for workers. 12% of all males
had completed secondary or higher education, while this number increases to 21%
for those working. This suggests that the eﬀect of a higher level of education on
the labor supply is positive. Similar observations can be drawn for other variables
in Table 8.1.
6. Results
I begin by comparing the age proﬁles of labor supply and retirement using a
sample of all males aged 55 to 70. Figure 8.3 shows that a substantial number
of males retire within two years after the normal retirement age. This ﬁnding is
not surprising: the Czech pension scheme has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on retirement
and on labor force participation. The proportion of inactive males is lower than
the share of pensioners more than 60 years old. This means that some retired
individuals are active in the labor market. A drop in the share of retired males
at age 60 in 1996 is explained by the shift in the normal retirement age. On the
other hand, there is a signiﬁcant decline in the number of males out of the labor
force at age 62 to 64. This indicates an increased economic activity of persons in
that age group in 1996.
Figure 8.4 reports a decline in the labor supply at age 60, while retired males
of age 62 to 64 supply more work in 1996 than in 1995. Figure 8.5 separates hours
of work from the overall labor supply. Working pensioners of age 60 and 61 supply
less hours of work, while no diﬀerence in hours of work is observed after age 61.15
These ﬁndings indicate that participation in the labor market is increased in 1996
for all pensioners aged 60 to 64, while in the case of working pensioners, hours of
work are reduced at age 60 and 61 as a result of the policy change.
Table 8.2 shows that hours of work are increased signiﬁcantly from 8.5 to 11.6
per week for pensioners aged 62 to 64. The F statistics, based on the comparison
for this age group so that it cannot be used as a control group.
15The number of observations is low at ages before 60. The observations are not reliable for
these ages in Figures 8.4 and 8.5.
11of between-groups sum of squares and within-groups sum of squares, indicate
that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the level better than 1%. The change goes
through participation since hours of work are virtually unchanged for this age
group. Working pensioners’ hours of work are unambiguously reduced from 38.6
to 34.4 for age 60 and 61. The eﬀect of the earnings test on the labor supply in
the age group 60 to 61 is outweighed by the increase in participation in the whole
sample. Hence, the overall labor supply is virtually unchanged at age 60 to 61
between 1995 and 1996.
The estimation of equation (4.1) sheds more light on what the eﬀect of the
earnings test is after controlling for other eﬀects not related to the policy change.
The ﬁrst column of Table 8.3 reports the tobit coeﬃcients of equation (4.1). The
earnings test reduces the overall labor supply of pensioners aﬀected by the policy
change by 11.8 hours per week. The eﬀect of year 1996 is positive, suggesting
that the labor supply of all males in the sample is increased in 1996. In order to
test for heteroskedasticity, I estimated equation (4.1) by ordinary least-squares.
The Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity strongly rejects the hypothesis of
constant variance.
Other columns of Table 8.3 show the results of the estimates corrected for
sample-selection bias (Heckman 1979) with White (1980) estimates of standard
errors correcting for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are also corrected for
clustering on persons’ identiﬁcation since the sample has repeated observations
on the same persons and these observations are not independent. I used two
industrial dummy variables denoting employment in agriculture and in manufac-
turing or construction as exclusion variables.16 Contrary to expectations, marital
status does not determine the participation equation, implying that it cannot be
employed as an exclusion variable. The estimate of Heckman’s λ is signiﬁcant,
indicating that the selection cannot be neglected.
The Heckman results suggest that hours of work of all working pensioners in
the sample do not change signiﬁcantly between 1995 and 1996. However, partic-
ipation increased by 9.3 percentage points in 1996.17 This overall change helps
separate the eﬀect of the earnings test aﬀe c t i n gm a l e sa g e d6 0t o6 1i n1 9 9 6w h o
decrease both their participation and hours of work. Participation is reduced by
16Heckman estimates in Table 8.3 did not change signiﬁcantly when I used only one of these
two variables as an exclusion variable.
17Hours of work do not change signiﬁcantly in the Heckman results. Hence, the rise of 9.3
percentage points in participation is equivalent to an increase of 11.3 hours per week according
to the tobit results.
127.7 percentage points, while hours of work drop by 4.8 hours per week as a re-
sponse to the policy change. This result is in accordance with the non-parametric
analysis that indicates that males aged 60 to 61 reduced hours of work by 4.2
hours per week (Table 8.2). The overall labor supply eﬀect of the earnings test
is, according to the tobit results, -11.8 hours per week.
The labor supply declines with age. Including the square of age in equation
(4.1) leaves other Heckman estimates almost unchanged. It indicates that the
estimates of the labor supply eﬀects of the earnings test are robust to the iden-
tiﬁcation assumption. Coeﬃcients on age and its square are, in addition, jointly
and separately insigniﬁcant. Higher education increases participation in the labor
market by 15.6 percentage points, while hours of work are virtually unchanged.
Poor health has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labor supply. It reduces participation
by 9.7 percentage points, and hours of work by 4.8 hours per week. Both tobit
and Heckman estimates of the eﬀects of age, higher education, and poor health
have the signs expected from other literature.
The tobit estimate of the eﬀe c to fm a r i t a ls t a t u sd o e sn o tt e l lu st h a tm a r r i e d
males signiﬁcantly change their labor supply in 1996. The Heckman estimates
of the eﬀect of marital status indicate that married males do not change their
participation signiﬁcantly, while hours of work are reduced by 3.1 per week. The
labor supply of older retired males is strongly related to the labor force status of
their wives. A working spouse increases the participation of her husband by 12.0
percentage points, and hours of work by 3.7 hours per week. The overall eﬀect is
14.6 hours per week according to the tobit results. This ﬁnding is in accordance
with the results reported in Blau (1998), who found that labor force status and
retirement are jointly determined among older couples in the U.S.
Contrary to the results in Reimers and Honig (1993), the tobit and Heckman
estimates of the eﬀect of occupation provide a strong negative relationship between
white collar jobs and the labor supply. The participation of white collar pensioners
is reduced by 7.7 percentage points in the sample, while hours of work are reduced
by 3.2 hours per week. The overall labor supply is reduced by 13.8 hours per
week. The Heckman results indicate that employment in agriculture reduces the
participation in the labor market by 17.4 percentage points. The participation
is decreased by 15.0 percentage points for males employed in manufacturing or
construction.
Eﬀects related to the economy are estimated using district unemployment
rates. The Heckman estimate indicates that participation declines by 2.3 percent-
age points when the rate of unemployment rises by 1 percentage point, while hours
13of work do not change signiﬁcantly. This is consistent with the tobit estimate of a
decrease of 2.8 hours per week in the overall labor supply. It suggests that regions
with higher unemployment are associated with less labor market opportunities for
pensioners.
The results are robust to the size of the control group. Using males aged 63
or 64 as a control group leaves Heckman estimate of the eﬀect of marital status
insigniﬁcant in the hours equation, while Heckman and tobit estimates of other
eﬀects are almost unchanged (Table 8.4).
I similarly tested how the announcement of the policy change aﬀects the re-
sults. In order to measure the 1996-eﬀect with respect to the period before the
announcement, one needs to omit observations from the period between the day
of the announcement and the end of 1995. Therefore, I dropped observations from
the third and fourth quarters of 1995 from the sample. The size of the sample was
reduced to 4295 observations. After controlling for the announcement, the hours
of work are reduced by 3.6 hours per week and participation is insigniﬁcantly
decreased by 5.9 percentage points, while other Heckman estimates are virtually
the same (Table 8.5). The tobit results indicate that the overall labor supply is
reduced by 8.2 hours per week. The estimates of the labor supply eﬀect are lower
in absolute terms than the results in Table 8.3, and are less signiﬁcant since the
sample is reduced. The response to the earnings test is moderately lower after
controlling for the announcement of the policy change.
The results are drawn using all durations of jobs in the sample. In 1995, a
worker had to switch jobs after accepting beneﬁts. In addition, pensioners were
eligible for retirement beneﬁts when the duration of their post-retirement work
was 1 year or less than 1 year. That requirement was replaced by the earnings
test in 1996. However, due to a legislative error, workers were allowed to accept
pensions without switching jobs in 1996. Excluding pensioners with jobs longer
than 1 year reduces the sample by 1090 observations. The tobit and the Heckman
estimates displayed in Table 8.6 diﬀer from the results presented in Table 8.3.
In particular, the Heckman estimates of the labor supply eﬀect of the earnings
test are lower. The participation is reduced by 5.2 percentage points, and hours
of work are decreased by 3.5 hours per week. However, reducing the sample by
excluding jobs of duration more than 1 year erroneously reduces the number of
working pensioners in 1996.
147. Policy Implications
The results of this paper indicate that retired males whose earnings are above
the exempt amount reduce their labor supply. The participation of all males at
age 60 to 61 is decreased by 7.7 percentage points and hours of work by 12.3%
according to the Heckman results from Table 8.3.18 To provide a comparison, the
Czech earnings test has a somewhat stronger eﬀect on hours of work than the less
stringent test in the United States.19
Table 8.7 displays the pecuniary value of the loss in the retired males’ labor
supply in 1996. According to the Czech Statistical Oﬃce, the average wage was
6455 CZK for 4647 employed retired males in 1996.20 Iu s e dt h ea g ep r o ﬁle of re-
tired males from Czech Social Security Administration records to derive the share
of employed retired males of age 60 to 61 among all employed male pensioners.
The drop in the participation of 7.7 percentage points is then equivalent to 13.5
million CZK. Similarly, the loss in hours worked is 7.1 million CZK. In total, the
earnings test reduced the pecuniary value of the labor supply by 20.6 million CZK.
This represents 0.001% of the nominal GDP in 1996. The loss in participation was
65.6% of the total loss, while the loss in hours of work was 34.4%. Applying recent
data on average post-retirement wages and the number of working pensioners, the
total loss increased to 42.7 million CZK in 2000. The GDP share increased to
0.002%. This indicates that the labor supply loss entailed by the earnings test
was negligible in 1996, but has doubled thereafter.
The other eﬀect of the earnings test not estimated in this paper is on the
probability of transitions from work to retirement. Czech Social Security Admin-
istration records indicate that the number of retired males decreased by 20.5%
at age 60 to 61, and by 6.0% at age 62 to 64 between the years 1995 and 1996.
The shift in the normal retirement age by 2 months in 1996 potentially reduced
the number of pensioners by 8.3% at age 60 to 61. Assuming that the number of
pensioners decreased by 6.0% in all age groups between 60 and 64, the number of
18Hours of work declined by 4.75 per week. This is 12.3% of the average weekly hours of work
for males aged 60 to 61 in 1995 (Table 8.2).
19Friedberg (2000) found that eliminating the U.S. earnings test would raise average hours of
work by 5.3% for persons at or above the exempt amount. While individuals below the exempt
amount are not aﬀected, the eﬀect for all individuals in the age group potentially aﬀected by
the earnings test is even lower.
20The Czech Statistical Oﬃce provides the data from a sample of employers. The data are not
adjusted to the economy-wide level. Hence, the eﬀect of the earnings test calculated in Table
8.7 is underestimated.
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the earnings test. Using data from Czech Social Security Administration records,
the number of new pensioners was 22,664 at age 60 to 61 in 1995. The number of
new pensioners was reduced by 1899 persons after the introduction of the earnings
test in 1996. Since the average new beneﬁt was 5597 CZK for males according to
the Czech Statistical Oﬃce, the pecuniary value of postponed retirement beneﬁts
was roughly 128 million CZK in 1996.21
In 1996, the pecuniary value of postponed retirement beneﬁts of persons de-
laying retirement after the test is introduced is greater than the loss in the retired
males’ labor supply. Hence, the government’s net revenues increased in 1996 as
a response to the policy change, indicating that the eﬀect of the policy change
was positive for the state in that year. However, the value of the retired males’
labor supply loss has doubled between 1996 and 2000. This suggests that the
positive eﬀect of the earnings test has diminished after 1996. Using the results of
this paper, the labor supply eﬀect of the earnings test should be evaluated using
recent data on new pensioners.
8. Conclusions
Comparing budget constraints before and after the introduction of the earnings
test implies that male workers whose post-retirement wage is between 55% and
100% of their pre-retirement wage are less likely to retire and supply less work
after retirement in 1996 than in 1995. In addition, some retired older males reduce
the post-retirement labor supply in 1996.
Correcting for sample selection, I found that the earnings test unambiguously
reduced both the participation and hours of work of retired males aged 60 and 61
in 1996. The estimate of Heckman’s λ is signiﬁcant, indicating that the selection
cannot be neglected. Results are robust to the choice of the exclusion variables,
to the identiﬁcation assumption, and to the size of the control age group. The
response to the earnings test is moderately lower in absolute terms after controlling
for the announcement of the policy change.
The pecuniary value of the retired males’ labor supply drop is negligible in
absolute value and as a share of GDP in 1996. Its size has, however, increased
signiﬁcantly between 1996 and 2000. In 1996, the pecuniary value of retirement
21The data on new pensioners in 1996 were not available at the time of the study. Therefore,
I measure the change in retirement between 1995 and 1996 using the age proﬁles of all retired
males from Czech Social Security Administration records.
16beneﬁts of persons delaying their retirement as a response to the policy change is
greater than the loss in the retired males’ labor supply. However, the change in
retirement between 1995 and 1996 is measured imprecisely, and, in addition, the
pecuniary value of the retired males’ labor supply loss is underestimated.
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18All Working
Number of observations 6564 1880
Number aged 60—61 2456 715
Number aged 62—64 4108 1165
Hours worked 10.24 (17.62) 35.74 (13.11)
Age 60—61 0.37 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49)
Year 1996 0.47 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Age 62.46 (1.38) 62.41 (1.37)
Higher education 0.12 (0.32) 0.21 (0.41)
Poor health 0.08 (0.28) 0.05 (0.21)
Married 0.90 (0.30) 0.90 (0.30)
Working spouse 0.24 (0.43) 0.34 (0.47)
White collar 0.54 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Job in agriculture 0.15 (0.36) 0.10 (0.30)
Job in manufacturing or construction 0.50 (0.50) 0.36 (0.48)
District unemployment rate (%) 2.87 (1.70) 2.56 (1.66)
Notes: mean values if not otherwise speciﬁed, standard deviations
in parentheses.
Table 8.1: Summary statistics.
All Working
Age 1995 1996 1995 1996
60—61 11.1 (1282) 10.2 (1174) 38.6 (369) 34.4*** (346)
62—64 8.5 (2171) 11.6*** (1937) 35.8 (516) 34.7 (649)
60 12.0 (622) 10.1* (464) 38.6 (193) 34.6*** (136)
61 10.3 (660) 10.2 (710) 38.7 (176) 34.4*** (210)
62 9.5 (727) 12.0*** (673) 36.5 (190) 35.4 (229)
63 8.7 (699) 11.3*** (672) 36.3 (168) 34.7 (219)
64 7.3 (745) 11.6*** (592) 34.5 (158) 34.1 (201)
60—64 9.5 (3453) 11.1*** (3111) 37.0 (885) 34.6 (995)
Notes: * diﬀerence signiﬁcant at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent,
*** at 1 percent; the number of observations in parentheses.
Table 8.2: Average weekly hours of work.
19Tobit Heckman selection+
Indep.\Dep. variable hours hours participation++ (dF/dx)
Age60_61 1.55 (3.06) 1.43 (1.77) 0.004
Year 1996 11.27*** (1.80) 0.92 (1.20) 0.093***
Age60_61*year1996 -11.77*** (2.92) -4.75*** (1.65) -0.077***
Age -2.58*** (0.94) -0.87 (0.60) -0.018*
Higher education 16.92*** (2.11) 1.62 (1.66) 0.156***
Poor health -15.33*** (2.94) -4.79** (2.34) -0.097***
Married -2.34 (2.38) -3.05* (1.79) -0.009
Working spouse 14.62*** (1.61) 3.73*** (1.19) 0.120***
White collar -13.82*** (1.66) -3.18** (1.29) -0.077***
Job in agriculture -23.63*** (2.31) -0.174***
Job in manuf. or constr. -15.41*** (1.77) -0.150***
District unempl. rate -2.77*** (0.43) -0.36 (0.37) -0.023***
Heckman’s λ 8.59*** (2.18)
Number of observations 6564 1880 6564
Log likelihood -11900 -11014
Notes: coeﬃcients if not otherwise speciﬁed; standard errors in parentheses;
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent; + standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity; ++ marginal eﬀects of changes in dependent
variables (discrete changes in dummies).
Table 8.3: Tobit and Heckman (1979) estimates.
20Tobit Heckman selection+
Indep.\Dep. variable hours hours participation++ (dF/dx)
Age60_61 0.82 (4.88) 1.63 (2.92) 0.008
Year 1996 12.36*** (2.25) 0.82 (1.49) 0.099***
Age60_61*year1996 -12.75*** (3.23) -4.75*** (1.85) -0.082***
Age -2.96** (1.46) -0.77 (0.87) -0.023
Higher education 16.30*** (2.44) 0.39 (1.86) 0.149***
Poor health -16.67*** (3.38) -5.32* (2.79) -0.105***
Married -0.29 (2.71) -1.94 (1.89) 0.004
Working spouse 12.94*** (1.85) 2.71** (1.24) 0.105***
White collar -12.70*** (1.88) -2.60* (1.35) -0.068**
Job in agriculture -24.32*** (2.64) -0.173***
Job in manuf. or constr. -15.20*** (2.01) -0.146***
District unempl. rate -3.35*** (0.49) -0.13 (0.40) -0.028***
Heckman’s λ 6.74*** (2.61)
Number of observations 5164 1461 5164
Log likelihood -9274 -8574
Notes: coeﬃcients if not otherwise speciﬁed; standard errors in parentheses;
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent; + standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity; ++ marginal eﬀects of changes in dependent
variables (discrete changes in dummies).
Table 8.4: Tobit and Heckman (1979) estimates: control group aged 63 and 64.
21Tobit Heckman selection+
Indep.\Dep. variable hours hours participation++ (dF/dx)
Age60_61 0.03 (4.31) 1.12 (2.34) -0.006
Year 1996 9.98*** (2.42) 0.72 (1.40) 0.087***
Age60_61*year1996 -8.16** (3.90) -3.64* (2.03) -0.059
Age -1.70 (1.11) -0.46 (0.68) -0.014
Higher education 17.02*** (2.50) 1.84 (1.67) 0.177***
Poor health -15.66*** (3.39) -4.79* (2.54) -0.107***
Married -1.25 (2.77) -3.63* (1.90) 0.003
Working spouse 15.65*** (1.86) 5.12*** (1.30) 0.130***
White collar -13.33*** (1.92) -3.08** (1.33) -0.082***
Job in agriculture -23.92*** (2.74) -0.191***
Job in manuf. or constr. -16.04*** (2.04) -0.165***
District unempl. rate -3.35*** (0.50) -0.63* (0.38) -0.029***
Heckman’s λ 9.20*** (1.99)
Number of observations 4295 1291 4295
Log likelihood -8046 -7456
Notes: coeﬃcients if not otherwise speciﬁed; standard errors in parentheses;
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent; + standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity; ++ marginal eﬀects of changes in dependent
variables (discrete changes in dummies).
Table 8.5: Tobit and Heckman (1979) estimates after correcting for the announce-
ment of the policy change.
22Tobit Heckman selection+
Indep.\Dep. variable hours hours participation++ (dF/dx)
Age60_61 1.27 (4.98) -1.35 (2.42) 0.007
Year 1996 10.69*** (3.02) -0.30 (1.51) 0.043***
Age60_61*year1996 -15.85*** (4.69) -3.52* (2.10) -0.052**
Age -6.33*** (1.58) -2.06*** (0.78) -0.022***
Higher education 20.12*** (3.51) 0.52 (1.97) 0.094***
Poor health -19.23*** (4.94) -4.32** (2.20) -0.062***
Married -0.82 (3.88) -0.21 (1.96) -0.004
Working spouse 13.79*** (2.65) 2.95** (1.27) 0.055***
White collar -23.78*** (2.96) -4.24*** (1.52) -0.085***
Job in agriculture -26.84*** (3.80) -0.090***
Job in manuf. or constr. -7.22** (3.11) -0.040**
District unempl. rate -4.42*** (0.72) -1.23*** (0.40) -0.017***
Heckman’s λ 7.33*** (2.13)
Number of observations 5474 798 5474
Log likelihood -5634 -5127
Notes: coeﬃcients if not otherwise speciﬁed; standard errors in parentheses;
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent; + standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity; ++ marginal eﬀects of changes in dependent
variables (discrete changes in dummies).
Table 8.6: Tobit and Heckman (1979) estimates: jobs with elapsed duration longer
than 1 year excluded from the sample.
Total loss Loss in participation Loss in hours worked
1996 (mil. CZK) 20.6 13.5 (65.6%) 7.1 (34.4%)
1996 GDP share (%) 0.001 0.0009 0.0005
2000 (mil. CZK) 42.7 28.0 14.7
2000 GDP share (%) 0.002 0.001 0.0008
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Figure 8.5: Working pensioners’ hours of work per week in 1995 and 1996.
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